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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to examine the impact on bank stock prices of the Asian 
and Russian financial crises for a sample of European banks. This issue is of importance 
regarding financial fragility and contagion effects within the banking industry. We develop an 
event study methodology based on a large number of macroeconomic news and on public 
announcements of individual bank exposure during the sharpest episodes in 1997 and in 1998. 
Whereas bank stocks did not react promptly to the Asian crisis we show evidence of 
significant abnormal returns for a large number of banks to events of the Russian Crisis 
suggesting the presence of contagion effects.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The two episodes of the Asian and Russian financial crises in the late 1990s led to a 
severe decline in stock prices on international capital markets. In Europe, bank stocks   
suffered from sharper fluctuations than average market indexes. In this context, the growing 
involvement of European banks in East Asian countries and in Russia during the late 1990s 
raises the issue of financial stability and contagion effects within the banking industry. This is 
important since the contagion hypothesis, if confirmed, has policy implications regarding the 
design of the safety net in response to financial crises. 
                                            
•Corresponding authors. Tel.: +33-555-43-69-34 ; fax: +33-555-43-69-34 ; amine.tarazi@unilim.fr;  
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 Beside Japanese banks, European banks expanded their activity in East Asian 
countries and they are extremely involved in Russia. For European banks, the share of loans 
in percentage of total international lending to Asian countries, increased from 51.9% in 
December 1994 to 58.1% in June 1997 (BIS (1996), (1997)). In Russia, loans from European 
banks represented 88.9% of the total amount of international bank lending in December 1997 
(BIS (1997), (1998(b))). A major concern was the extent to which European banks were 
actually exposed and suffered from the collapse in financial markets, debt defaults and 
exchange rate movements. European bank lending was led in Asia by German banks, 
followed by UK and French banks and in Russia by German banks, Swiss banks and to a 
lesser extent by French, Dutch, Austrian and Italian banks. At the end of 1996, the exposure 
of UK banks in Asia was mostly spread among three countries - South Korea, Thailand and 
Taiwan - and to a lesser extent Indonesia and Malaysia. Similarly to UK banks, French and 
German bank lending was also concentrated on South Korea and Thailand involving 
Indonesia as well (BIS (1997); 1998(b)). Before the crisis (end of 1996), German and UK 
banks reduced their exposures in South Korea and Thailand whereas French banks increased 
their loans in each of the five countries in which they were already involved. At the end of 
June 1997, German, French and UK banks had their strongest exposures in South Korea. For 
German and French banks, exposures were also notably high in Thailand.  
The goal of this paper is to measure how news about macroeconomic difficulties and 
the deteriorating quality of bank portfolios due to country specific exposures affected the 
stock prices of European banks during these two episodes of financial crisis. We conduct an 
event study to analyse the pattern followed by individual bank stock returns for the largest 
possible sample of European banks. More specifically, our aim is to draw policy 
recommendations regarding the contagion hypothesis that is to assess whether non exposed 
banks need to be protected, along with exposed banks, under such circumstances.  
The paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 discusses the link with the existing literature 
on the reaction of bank stock prices to financial crises. Section 3 describes the data and the 
choice of events enabling us to carry out an event study. Section 4 analyses the reaction of 
European bank stock prices to bank specific announcements and to general events of the 
Asian and Russian crises. Section 5 extends the empirical investigation to capture possible 
contagion effects and section 6 concludes.  
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2. Related literature 
 
The existing literature on the reaction of bank stock prices to financial crises is mainly 
dedicated to US banks. A large number of studies investigated the effect of announcements 
and news on stock returns by following an event-study methodology raising the issue of 
market efficiency and hence the speed and accuracy of the adjustment of stock prices to new 
public information. Event studies focusing on the presence of significant abnormal returns for 
US banks predominantly addressed the issue of the international debt crisis of the 80’s or the 
Latin America currency crises of the 1990s (Cornell and Shapiro (1986), Mathur and 
Sundaram (1997), Kilic, Tufte and Hassan (1999), Bessler and Nohel (2000)). An important 
question raised in most papers is relative to the presence of contagion effects adversely 
affecting banks with low risk exposures as well as highly exposed banks. These contagion 
effects are of particular interest for banking institutions because of the central role played by 
banks and other financial intermediaries in systemic risk.  
Amazingly, while banks have often been considered as being at the heart of the Asian and 
Russian financial crises, to our knowledge, only few exceptions focused on EU banks (Kho 
and Stulz (2000) and Rime (2003)). Examining the impact of the Asian crisis on bank stock 
indexes for both Western (US, France, Germany and the UK) and East Asian countries 
(Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand), Kho and Stulz (2000) report 
no significant abnormal returns for Western banks. Regarding the Russian financial crisis, 
Rime (2003) performed an event study for Swiss banks showing that stock returns were 
negatively affected by some of the most reported events with mixed evidence about contagion 
effects. Nevertheless, his results support the hypothesis that investors essentially 
discriminated among banks on the basis of broad categories (domestically-
oriented/internationally-oriented). In this paper, we focus on the reaction of European banks 
to both the Asian and the Russian financial crises by conducting an event study applied to 
individual bank stock data instead of bank stock indexes. We also take into account a large 
number of macroeconomic events but also bank specific events to capture possible contagion 
effects by estimating a multivariate model.  
 
3. Data set and description of the events 
 
Our sample consists of 109 European banks established in 11 countries (4 for Austria, 5 
for Belgium, 23 for France, 8 for Germany, 30 for Italy, 5 for the Netherlands, 11 for 
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Denmark, 3 for Ireland, 9 for Switzerland, 4 for Greece and 7 for the UK) all listed on official 
European stock markets. The financial institutions chosen to conduct our tests are commercial 
banks and mutual and cooperative banks. We excluded banks when their stocks were not 
continuously traded over our sample period. Daily stock indexes (European bank index, and 
domestic market indexes) and individual bank stock prices, for the 1996-1998 period, are 
taken from Datastream International and annual income statements and balance sheets for 
individual banks, from 1996 to 1998, come from Bankscope Fitch IBCA.  
During the Asian and Russian crises, a large number of macroeconomic events affected 
the Asian and Russian financial markets. In this study we limited our choice to the most 
significant dates and periods reported in most studies (BIS (1998 (a)), BIS (1999), Kho and 
Stulz (2000) and King (2001)). We also considered announcements by European banks, 
which occurred within the crisis period, on their degree of exposure and the directly linked 
profit warnings. This information comes from Reuters’ archives. In this sense we were able to 
gather both general macroeconomic announcements dates and individual bank specific 
announcement dates (see Table 1). 
The macroeconomic announcements we consider for the Asian financial crisis include the 
two widely documented stages of the crisis
1
. The first stage began with the devaluation of the 
Thai bath on July 2 1997 (M_A3). This date corresponds to the beginning of the financial 
panic that spread to all East Asian “tigers” (Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore). The second 
stage began in late October 1997 when Taiwan devaluated its currency (M_A4) centered on 
Hong Kong and South Korea and spread to Indonesia and Taiwan. Financial turmoil occurred 
on October 22 in South Korea and Hong Kong (M_A5). On this same day Hong Kong raised 
official rates from 7 percent to 300 percent and Standard & Poor’s downgraded Korea’s 
foreign debt causing a massive outflow of capital. On November 1, Indonesia closed 16 banks 
(M_A6) and on November 17 the Korean won sharply depreciated (M_A7). Two events are 
also selected before the beginning of the Asian crisis, reflecting the growing pressures on the 
Asian financial markets: on May 14 1997 speculative attacks occurred against the Thai bath 
(M_A1) and on June 25 1997, the Thai government withdrew its support to one of the major 
financial company (M_A2). Three individual bank specific announcements are also included 
in our event set (B_A1, B_A2 and B_A3). These events concern two British banks (HSBC 
and Standard Chartered) and one German bank (Dresdner Bank).  
 
                                            
1 King (2001) provides a detailed review of the Asian crisis. 
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Table 1. Description of macro-economic and individual bank announcements 
Event number and event 
window 
Description 
ASIAN CRISIS RELATED ANNOUNCEMENTS 
Macroeconomic announcements 
M_A1: 14/05/97 -15/05/97 Speculative attacks against the Thai bath 
M_A2: 25/06/97 -26/06/97 Thai government withdrew its support to one of the major financial company 
M_A3: 02/07/97 -03/07/97 Floating of the Thai bath 
M_A4: 17/10/97 -20/10/97 Taiwan devaluated its currency 
M_A5: 22/10/97 –23/10/97 Financial turmoil in Hong Kong and South Korea 
M_A6: 31/10/97-03/11/97 Closure of 16 Indonesian banks  
M_A7: 17/11/97 -18/11/97 Depreciation of the Korean won 
Individual bank announcements 
B_A1: 21/07/97-22/07/97 Rumours over Standard Chartered looses related to its activity in Asia 
B_A2: 20/08/97-21/08/97 Goldman and Sachs downgraded HSBC and Standard Chartered Bank 
B_A3: 28/11/97-01/12/97 Dresdner Bank announced an increase of its provisions to cover credit 
exposure in Asia 
RUSSIAN CRISIS RELATED ANNOUNCEMENTS 
Macroeconomic announcements 
M_R1:17/08/98-18/08/98 Modification of the exchange rate regime in Russia, and suspension of interest 
payments on public debt 
M_R2: 26/08/98-27/08/98 Floating of the rouble 
M_R3: 01/09/98-02/09/98 Authority stop supporting the rouble 
Individual bank announcements 
B_R1: 28/07/98-29/07/98 Dresdner Bank announced the level of its exposure in Russia 
B_R2: 25/08/98 UBS announced the level of its exposure in Russia 
B_R3: 28/08/98-29/08/98 Deutsche Bank announced the level of its exposure in Russia 
B_R4: 03/09/98-07/09/98 Credit Suisse announced the level of its exposure in Russia 
B_R5: 08/09/98 ABN Amro announced the level of its exposure in Russia 
B_R6: 09/09/98-10/09/98 Société Générale and BNP Paribas announced the level of their exposure in 
Russia 
B_R7: 30/09/98-02/10/98 Dresdner Bank announced a decrease in profit related to its exposure in Russia
B_R8: 05/10/98-06/10/98 Deutsche Bank announced a decrease in profit compared to the expected one 
B_R9: 09/10/98-10/10/98 ING announced an estimated cut in the profit of 15% to 35% 
 
In the case of the Russian crisis, speculative attacks against the Rouble began during 
the first semester of 1998. The deepening of the financial difficulties led the authorities to 
widen the band of fluctuation of the exchange rate and to suspend interest payments on public 
debt on August 17 (M_R1). On August 26, Russian authorities officially let the rouble 
floating (M_R2). The government stopped supporting the rouble on September 1 (M_R3). 
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Nine individual bank specific announcements (B_R1, B_R2, B_R3, B_R4, B_R5, B_R6, 
B_R7, B_R8 and B_R9), involving two German banks (Dresdner Bank and Deutsche Bank), 
two French banks (Société Générale and BNP-Paribas), two Swiss banks (UBS and Credit 
Suisse) and two Dutch banks (ING and ABN Amro), are also considered. Table 1 summarizes 
our set of macro-economic and individual bank announcements. 
 
4.  Reaction of banks’ stock prices to macro and individual bank announcements 
 
4.1  Event study methodology 
We use an event-study methodology based on the market model to test for the 
presence of abnormal returns during the Asian and Russian crises. To deal with clustering 
effects and industry induced correlation of returns, we estimate a multivariate regression 
model based on Zellner’s (1962) seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) methodology. 
Number of studies employed this procedure to analyze the reaction of US bank stocks to 
either international debt crises or currency crises (Cornett and Tehranian (1990), Madura et al. 
(1992), Unal et al. (1993), Mathur and Sundaram (1997) and Lau and McInish (2003)). In our 
study, two types of estimations are conducted: estimations based on industry level data and 
estimations based on individual bank data. The multivariate estimated model is the following: 
22
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j=1
22
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t
t
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α γ δ ε
α γ δ ε
α γ δ ε
⎧ +⎪⎪⎪ +⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪ +⎪⎩
∑∑
∑
                                                 (1) 
                                         
where Ri,t is either the rate of return on the stock of bank i on day t (for estimations based on 
individual data) or the rate of return on the bank stock index of country i on day t (for 
estimations based on industry data); RM,t is the return of the national market index; REUBANK,t 
is the return of the European bank stock index provided by Datastream International.  
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For each of the 22 events, indexed j and presented in Table 1, we define a dummy 
variable Dj,t taking the value of 1 the event day and the day after
2
 and 0 elsewhere. The 
coefficient δi,j of the dummy variable Dj,t captures the effect of event j for bank i or for the 
banking index of country i. Abnormal returns are captured by the statistical significance of the 
related coefficients. A negative and significant sign is expected when the market anticipates a 
negative impact of the considered event for bank i. Therefore, we only focus on negative 
reactions. Because we simultaneously include the dummies related to the Asian and Russian 
events, the system of equations (1) is estimated from January 1 1996 to December 31 1998
3
.   
 
4.2. Industry level and individual bank results  
Before considering our sample of individual banks, we first conduct our event study at the 
industry level. Regarding the Asian crisis, only 4 domestic banking systems (Austrian, Greek, 
Dutch and Swiss) experience a negative significant reaction and only for 1 out of the 10 
considered events
4
. These findings are not consistent with the hypothesis that the market 
should experience the strongest reaction for the most involved banking systems in Asian 
countries (i.e. British, French and German). It seems that the market was caught out by the 
Asian crisis and that the sharp decrease in the market as a whole (all industries and sectors) 
might have mitigated bank specific effects. However, regarding the Russian crisis the market 
reaction was stronger which is in line with the relatively stronger involvement of European 
banks in Russia. Indeed, our results show that the market significantly reacts for a greater 
number of banking indexes for events related to the Russian crisis. Except for the Irish 
system, the coefficients of the dummy variables are significant and negative at least for one of 
the selected 12 events. The French banking system, one of the most involved in Russia, 
experiences the highest number of significant reactions (4 out of 12 events). Conversely, for 
the German banking system, which on the whole presented the highest level of exposure to 
Russia, market prices exhibit significant abnormal returns only for 1 event.  
Tables 2, 3 and 4 sum up the estimation results for the 109 European banks of our 
sample. We first study, for each crisis and for each type of event (macroeconomic 
announcements and individual bank announcements) the negative reaction of the market to 
                                            
2 For two of the considered events (B_R2 and B_R5) the event windows overlap with another event window. To 
avoid confusion we restricted event windows to event days.  
3 We also conducted separate estimations for each crisis (from January 01 1996 to December 31 1997 for the 
Asian crisis and from January 01 1997 to December 31 1998 for the Russian Crisis). The results remained 
unchanged.  
4 The results of industry level estimations are not presented in the paper but are available from the authors upon 
request.  
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the different events. The results obtained at the individual bank level support those obtained 
above on the basis of bank indexes revealing a stronger reaction for the Russian crisis. For the 
Asian crisis only 21 significant market reactions are obtained against 124 for the Russian 
crisis (Tables 2 and 3). Out of the 21 significant reactions obtained for the Asian crisis 
(respectively 124 for the Russian crisis), 15 (respectively 30 for the Russian crisis) are related 
to macroeconomic announcements and 6 (respectively 94 for the Russian crisis) are related to 
individual bank announcements. The higher number of significant negative reactions for the 
Russian crisis is in line with the heavier exposure of European banks in Russia outlined 
previously
5
.  
Table 4 shows for each crisis and each type of event, the number of banks for which a 
negative and significant market reaction is obtained for at least one event. For the Asian 
crisis, the 21 significant reactions we obtain in our estimations are relative to 21 different 
banks whereas the 124 significant reactions regarding the Russian crises are distributed 
among 70 banks. Also, in the case of the Russian crisis, several significant reactions can be 
witnessed for the same bank.  Furthermore, out of the 21 banks for which a negative market 
reaction is observed during the Asian crisis, 14 also present abnormal returns during the 
Russian crisis. 
                                            
5 In this study we solely focus on negative reactions. Therefore, in Tables 2, 3 and 4 we only present the 
percentage of banks with a negative market reaction. However, other results, which are not presented here but 
are available on request, show that the percentage of significant and positive market reactions for all the events is 
4.22% (46 reactions) for the Asian crisis and 5.88% (77 reactions) for the Russian crisis.  
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Table 2. Market reaction to Asian crisis related events for individual banks (number of negative and significant abnormal reactions for each event) 
Macroeconomic announcements 
Individual bank  
announcements 
M_A1 M_A2 M_A3 M_A4 M_A5 M_A6 M_A7 
Number of reactions to 
macroeconomic 
announcements B_A1 B_A2 B_A3 
Number of reactions 
to individual bank 
announcements 
Total number 
of reactions 
2 
(1.83%) 
4 
(3.36%) 
4 
(3.36%) 
0 3 
(2.75%) 
1 
(0.92%) 
1 
(0.92%) 
15 
(1.96%) 
2 
(1.83%) 
2 
(1.83%) 
2 
(1.83%) 
6 
(1.83%) 
21 
(1.93%) 
 ( ): number of negative market reactions in % of the total number of banks of our sample. 
( ): average number of significant negative market reactions per event in % of the total number of banks of our sample. 
 
Table 3. Market reaction to Russian crisis related events for individual banks (number of negative and significant abnormal reactions for each event) 
Macroeconomic 
announcements 
Individual bank announcements 
M_R1 M_R2 M_R3 
Number of 
reactions to 
macroeconomic 
announcements
B_R1 B_R2 B_R3 B_R4 B_R5 B_R6 B_R7 B_R8 B_R9 
Number of 
reactions to 
individual 
bank 
announcements 
Total 
number 
of 
reactions  
3 
(2.75%) 
14 
(12.84%) 
13 
(11.92%) 
30 
(9.17%) 
3 
(2.75%)
5 
(4.59%) 
8 
(7.33%) 
21 
(19.27%) 
7 
(6.42%) 
11 
(10.09%) 
20 
(18.35%) 
10 
(9.17%) 
9 
(8.26%) 
94 
(9.58%) 
124 
(9.48%) 
( ): number of negative market reactions in % of the total number of banks of our sample. 
( ):  average number of significant negative market reactions per event in % of the total number of banks of our sample. 
 
 
Table 4. Number of banks for which at least one negative and significant reaction is obtained for each crisis  
and each type of event 
 Macroeconomic announcements Individual bank announcements All events taken together 
Asian Crisis 15 6 21 
Russian Crisis 32 60 70 
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5. Market reaction and bank exposure announcements 
 
In order to determine which factors can explain the probability for a bank to be 
affected by a negative market reaction during the two crises, and also to test for the presence 
of contagion effects, we first provide descriptive statistics on the relationship between market 
reactions and bank exposure announcements. We then further analyse this relationship with 
logit estimations
6
.  
Two types of binary variables are computed related to market reactions and bank 
exposure announcements.  
Firstly, building on the results obtained in the previous section, we computed for the 
Russian crisis event binary variables, which take for bank i the value of 1 when a significant 
market reaction (at the 5% level) is obtained in our estimations and 0 otherwise. We 
deliberately ignored all the events for which we obtain too few observations which take the 
value of 1, that is all the events related to the Asian crisis. We also defined a binary variable 
named RUSSIATOTi, which takes for bank i the value of 1 when a significant reaction of the 
market is obtained at least one time out of the different events j (at the 5% level) and 0 
otherwise. Eventually, we also built a binary variable, named M_RTOTi reflecting a 
significant reaction of the market for bank i at least one time out of the three macroeconomic 
announcements events of the Russian crisis and 0 otherwise.  
Secondly, since bank country exposures are not reported in Bankscope, we used 
information provided by Reuters’ archives and annual bank reports to define two sets of 
binary variables: (i) a variable D_expo, which takes the value of 1 when a bank publicly 
announced its degree of exposure during the crisis period and 0 otherwise; (ii) for each event 
j, a variable, D_expobeforej, which takes the value of 1 when a bank publicly revealed its 
degree of exposure before event j and 0 otherwise. 
In our sample, out of the 12 banks which publicly revealed their exposure in Russia
7
, 
10 exhibited a significant reaction (2 French banks, 2 German banks, 2 Dutch banks, 1 Swiss 
                                            
6 We also analysed the relationship between significant stock price reactions and bank characteristics by 
regressing stock price reactions on a set of variables (bank size, structure of bank balance sheets and income 
statements and capital adequacy). Our results suggest that market operators did not discriminate among banks on 
the basis of their general profiles.   
7 These twelve banks are: Commerzbank (Germany), UBS (Switzerland), Deutsche Bank (Germany), ABN 
Amro (Netherlands), Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank (Austria), Dresdner Bank (Germany), Bank Austria 
(Austria), Crédit Suisse (Switzerland), Barclays Bank (UK), BNP (France), Société Générale (France) and ING 
Bank (Netherlands). 
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bank, 1 British bank and 2 Austrian banks). Among these 12 banks, the market significantly 
reacted, at least once, for 9 banks which had announced their degree of exposure before the 
event date. Conversely, the market also significantly reacted at least once during the Russian 
crisis for 60 banks which had not announced their exposures suggesting the presence of 
contagion effects. We also examine for each bank the distribution of significant market 
reactions and its relationship with individual bank exposure. Since, in our sample, the 
maximum number of abnormal returns for each bank is limited to 4, we define 4 reaction 
classes all regarding the Russian crisis: (i) no reaction: banks which never exhibit abnormal 
returns during the Russian crisis; (ii) low reaction: only 1 significant reaction; (iii) 
intermediate reaction: 2 significant reactions; (iv) high reaction: at least 3 significant 
reactions. As shown in Table 5, out of the 109 banks of our sample, 39 never exhibit 
significant abnormal returns whereas the market frequently reacted for 12 banks of which 
only 3 had announced their exposures. 
 
The event binary variables were then regressed (logit estimation) on each exposure 
proxy. We follow here the methodology proposed by Cornel and Shapiro (1986) and Unal et 
al. (1993) to test the contagion hypothesis. Whereas these authors examine contagion by 
regressing (OLS estimations) abnormal returns on actual loan exposure, we here use the 
binary variables D_expo and D_expobejorej in a Logit setting because information on actual 
individual exposure is not available for a large number of banks in our sample. The results, 
presented in Table 6, show that the coefficient of D_expo is never significant. This absence of 
positive and significant coefficient of the independant variables is consistent with the 
contagion effect hypothesis. Higher exposure which is publicly announced does not 
significantly contribute to explain negative abnormal returns and banks with a low exposure 
suffered from significant falls in stock prices as well as highly exposed banks.  
However, the variable D_expobeforej is significant at the 1% level for 5 events out of 
8. For 4 of these events the coefficients are negative and highly significant. Consequently, 
exposure announcements before an event tend to reduce the probability for bank stocks to 
exhibit abnormal returns suggesting that the market had already integrated the news, good or 
bad, before the event date (a finding which supports the semi-strong efficiency hypothesis). 
Therefore, when banks reveal their exposures before a given event actually occurs or before a 
crisis is publicly announced, market participants might well be lenient with these banks but 
“punish” the other banks. Contagion effects might in this case be limited to the subset of non 
announcing banks.  
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Table 5.  Distribution of significant market reactions 
Number of banks No reaction Low reaction Intermediate reaction High reaction Total 
Out of  the total number of banks 
 39    
(35.78%) 
31   
(28.44%) 
27   
(24.77%) 
12   
(11.01%) 
109  
Out of  the total number of announcing banks  
 2    
(16.67%) 
2   
(16.67%) 
5   
(41.66%) 
3   
(25%) 
12 
No reaction: banks which never exhibit abnormal returns during the Russian crisis; low reaction: only 1 significant reaction;  
 intermediate reaction: 2 significant reactions ; high reaction: at least 3 significant reactions. 
 
 
 
Table 6. Market reaction and bank exposure announcement 
 Dependent variable 
 B_R3 M_R3 B_R4 B_R5 B_R6 B_R7 B_R8 B_R9 M_RTOT RUSSIATOT
D_expobeforej -31.018*** 
(-56.92) 
-31.428***
(-72.50) 
1.78*** 
(2.45) 
-30.09*** 
(-60.61) 
2.17*** 
(2.87) 
1.23* 
(1.78) 
-0.34 
(-0.32) 
1.53* 
(1.65) 
- - 
D_expo 
 
- - - - - - - - 
-0.186 
(-0.165) 
1.126 
(1.403) 
Dependent variable=1 
Dependent variable=0 
96 
13 
90 
19 
95 
14 
102 
7 
99 
10 
91 
18 
97 
12 
103 
6 
77 
32 
39 
70 
This table reports binary estimation results respectively for 2 sets of dependent variables. For the first set of 8 dependent variables (B_R3, M_R3, B_R4 B_R5 
B_R6 B_R7 B_R8 B_R9), the dependant variable is regressed on D_expobeforej (variable which takes the value of 1 when a bank publicly revealed its degree 
of exposure before event j and 0 otherwise). For the second set of 2 dependent variables (M_RTOT, RUSSIATOT), the dependant variable is regressed on 
D_expo (variable which takes the value of 1 when a bank publicly announced its degree of exposure during the crisis period and 0 otherwise). z-statistics are 
in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate significance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Dep = 1 and Dep = 0 are the number of observations respectively 
when the dependent variable is equal to 1 and 0. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The objective of this paper was to examine the reaction of European bank stock prices to 
events of the Asian and Russian financial crises. Based on a sample of 109 listed banks and a 
set of macroeconomic announcements and individual bank public announcements, our study 
first shows that whereas bank stock prices did not react to the Asian crisis, they exhibited 
significant abnormal returns in response to several events of the Russian Crisis. Using bank 
public announcements to proxy country exposures of loan portfolios, we find a strong link 
between bank stock reaction and bank individual news. However, bank stocks are also 
sensitive to news specific to other banks suggesting evidence of possible contagion effects. 
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